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Abstract
Configurational arrangement of network architecture and interaction character of individuals are two most influential
factors on the mechanisms underlying the evolutionary outcome of cooperation, which is explained by the well-established
framework of evolutionary game theory. In the current study, not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, we measure
Moran-evolution of cooperation to support an analytical agreement based on the consequences of the replicator equation in
a finite population. The validity of the measurement has been double-checked in the well-mixed network by the Langevin
stochastic differential equation and the Gillespie-algorithmic version of Moran-evolution, while in a structured network, the
measurement of accuracy is verified by the standard numerical simulation. Considering the Birth-Death and Death-Birth
updating rules through diffusion of individuals, the investigation is carried out in the wide range of game environments
those relate to the various social dilemmas where we are able to draw a new rigorous mathematical track to tackle the
heterogeneity of complex networks. The set of modified criteria reveals the exact fact about the emergence and maintenance
of cooperation in the structured population. We find that in general, nature promotes the environment of coexistent traits.
Keywords: Analytical measurement, Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, Pair approximation, BD and DB updating
rules, Graph heterogeneity
1. Introduction
The simple stochastic process, Moran process has long been known in biology to describe the outcome of an evolutionary
process in a finite population in which two distinct alleles are competing for dominance. In particular, evolution on networks,
the frequency dependent Moran-evolution moves ahead through two popular update rules: Birth-Death updating and
Death-Birth updating [1, 2, 3, 4]. Albeit the order of the two events in each rule is not same, both of the rules follow the
same methodology to choose an individual for reproduction, and the choice is defined by a probability which is proportional
to its fitness while an individual is chosen randomly for death. The phenomena corresponding to the particular social
dilemmas are incorporated with the update rules in order to measure the evolution of cooperation under a convenient
framework of evolutionary game theory for the modelling of the well-mixed as well as structured populations.
Email address: bijan0317@yahoo.com; bijan0317@gmail.com (Bijan Sarkar)
Preprint submitted to Physica A February 16, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
05
56
9v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
14
 Fe
b 2
01
8
A well-mixed population can be described as a structured population where in each time step each of the individuals
has an opportunity to interact with every other individual of the population, i.e., in network language a well-mixed network
is a complete graph with having the variance of the degree distribution equal to zero in respect of time as well as position.
Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics have been studied on infinitely large homogeneous population.
Around the middle of past decade the initiative was taken to combine the evolutionary game theory and the Moran process
in order to investigate the evolutionary dynamics in finite population [1, 5]. On the level of individuals, identified three
microscopic stochastic features viz.: selection, reproduction and replacement, Traulsen et al. [6] successfully derived the
standard and the adjusted replicator dynamics. It has recently been reported that the aspiration dynamics in a structured
population and the evolutionary dynamics in the corresponding well-mixed population follow nearly the same evolutionary
outcome path [7].
Since the cooperative behaviour is very natural to observe in various forms of life system of: bacteria, plants, animal,
human society, tissue architecture in multi-cellular organism, etc., how cooperation emerging and being enhanced are the
most captivating section of evolutionary dynamics. For a structured population, the limited dispersal act in individuals
ensures that the offspring of a parent is located close to the parent, i.e., the act enables cooperators to form a cluster for
which the boosting capacity to increase the frequency interaction rate in cooperator individuals is higher than that of in
random interaction. Such assortment between cooperators and defectors is one of the explanations of the enhancement of
cooperation in a structured pattern [8, 9]. However, Perc [10] shows that the expected promotion of cooperation may be
less for games governed by group interactions than originally assumed.
For representing a population structure, we use the mathematical tool of evolutionary graph theory: vertices correspond
to individuals and edges indicate interactions [11]. Using pair approximation (see for application procedure: [12, 13, 14,
15, 16]) in the limit of weak selection, the analytical theory about the emergence and the enhancement of cooperation
on a regular structure was developed where the theory itself revels that benefit-to-cost ratio is to be greater than the
degree of the graph [2] – or greater than the mean degree of the nearest neighbours [17]. Later, the condition straight
forwardly is utilised to derive the replicator equation on graph [18]. As in this assumption of evolutionary process there is
no mutation just selection, the offspring of each individual is a perfect copy of its parent. It is generally believed that the
graph heterogeneity dramatically enhances cooperation in complex network [19, 20, 21, 22] where for accounting a range
of heterogeneities at the level of individuals, networks theory provides a new modelling paradigm. In the past few years,
from multiple viewpoints the effect of nontrivial topologies on evolution of cooperation has been explored [23, 24, 25].
Analytically, evolutionary games on heterogeneous graphs have mainly investigated under Death-Birth updating and Pair-
Wise Comparison updating [26, 27, 28]. Based on theoretical study, Li et al. [29] recently introduces a new state variable to
measure the time evolution of cooperation on a heterogeneous graph. This is the first model in which rigorous mathematical
procedure is followed. Besides the network reciprocity, in the theory of how and why cooperation emerges the effect of
individuals’ movement through the form of diffusion can also be counted, as a direct reciprocity, easily [30].
Frequently, in material and natural world when the population size is relatively small, each member of the population
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generally interacts with any other member of the population in a random way. Our intuitive sense also suggests that if
well-mixed and pattern interactions run parallel, the well-mixed prevails over the pattern interaction. Additionally, we
know that world wild life follows the random interaction, their evolution has strong influence to control the eco-system.
As we may use the update rules here too, replicator equation, a measurement procedure of evolution inevitably plays a
crucial role to measure the whole scenarios.
In the present article, p(k, k˜) denotes the conditional probability of a vertex with degree k connected to other vertices
with degree k˜. We consider that for vertices with degree k, degree distribution of a graph is equal to p(k). That is, the
considered vertex has k-number of links. The probability that each of these links is attached to a vertex with degree k˜ is
given by: kp(k˜). More precisely, the probability that an end of a link is attached to a vertex with degree k˜ is given by:
kp(k˜)
z , z being average degree of the graph. Therefore, we have: p(k, k˜) = p(k).
kp(k˜)
z . In the model of Moran-evolution,
p(k, k˜) – a non-symmetric function – is to be implicitly involved with the transition probabilities.
In the present treatment, the analytical measurement tool of Moran-evolution of cooperation in the well-mixed popula-
tion as well as in the structured population is derived as a form of replicator equation to check the accuracy of predictions
about the outcomes of an evolution. The accuracy is evaluated through stochastic simulation in the comparison mode.
Considering the Birth-Death and Death-Birth processes on homogeneous and heterogeneous networks in the wide range
of game environments, every possible outcome of evolution has been attained and focused for a logical explanation. The
effects on the outcomes also take into account the diffusion of individuals on networks. We point out many new results
along with the known results. Here, modeller’s main intention is that find out the right path so that we are able to
determine the appropriate ranges of the influential factors of Moran-evolution, properly.
2. The well-mixed network effect on Moran-evolution
In order to investigate the Moran-evolution in finite population, we consider the evolution of a population with two
strategies C and D. The state variable i denotes the number of C players and N − i D players where the population size
N is constant as in each discrete time step one birth and one death occur. Fitness of C and D, respectively, is given by:
fi = 1− w + wFi, gi = 1− w + wGi. The parameter w that measures the intensity of the selections is a number between
0 and 1. Strategies C and D are neutral variants if w = 0. If w = 1 selection is strong; the fitness is entirely determined
by the expected payoffs Fi and Gi. And w  1 interprets the case of weak selection where the payoff contributes only a
small effect on fitness. Every individual interacts with each representative individual of the considering population where
the expected payoff of C and D individuals is determined by the fraction of coplayers of both types. If the payoffs of an
ith individual getting from each interaction with a jth individual are denoted by the piij , then excluding self-interactions,
the expected payoffs are given by
Fi =
piCC(i− 1) + piCD(N − i)
N − 1 , Gi =
piDCi+ piDD(N − i− 1)
N − 1 . (1)
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In the Moran process, the evolution is defined by the transition probabilities T+i : moving i to i + 1 C players , T
−
i :
moving i to i − 1 C players and the process remains in state i is simply T 0i = 1 − T+i − T−i . All other transitions have
zero probabilities. Introducing the coefficient θi that captures the effects of population structure and update rules in weak
selection we have,
T−i
T+i
≈ 1 + wθi. The mixed population of C and D will eventually end up in either all−C or all−D
through this process, and the occurrence is measured by the fixation probability. Here, fixation probabilities of C and D
respectively can be calculated as:
ρC =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1(
T−i
T+i
)
≈ 1
N
− w
N2
N−i∑
i=1
(N − i)θi, (2)
ρD =
1
1 +
∑N−1
j=1
∏j
i=1(
T+N−i
T−N−i
)
≈ 1
N
+
w
N2
N−i∑
i=1
(N − i)θN−i. (3)
This is the one of the procedures to deal with the evolutionary outcomes of cooperation where is to be the main task to
calculate the values of fixation probabilities. Zukewich et al. [4] shows that the coefficient θi plays the same role as the
fixation probability; thus we can avoid the diffusion approximation procedure [31]. However, in the present study, we do
not follow this track because we are interested to derive a deterministic dynamical system of cooperation in weak selection.
Here, we also note that if xi is the fraction of chance of ending up the process in state N when starting from state i, then
at the neutral drift (i.e., where fi = gi = 1) we have xi =
i
N .
Under the Birth-Death (BD) procedure in the case of well-mixed population, the transition probability of the number
of C’s increasing from i to i+ 1 when a C reproduces and a D dies is
T+i =
ifi
ifi + (N − i)gi ·
N − i
N
=
i
N
N − i
N
+ ω
i
N
(
N − i
N
)2(Fi −Gi) +O(ω2)
= xi(1− xi)[1 + ω(1− xi)
1− 1N
{(piCC − piDC)xi
+(piCD − piDD)(1− xi)− 1
N
(piCC − piDD)}] +O(ω2), (4)
and the transition probability of the number of C’s decreasing from i to i− 1 when a D reproduces and a C dies is
T−i =
(N − i)gi
ifi + (N − i)gi ·
i
N
=
i
N
N − i
N
+ ω(
i
N
)2
N − i
N
(Gi − Fi) +O(ω2)
= xi(1− xi)[1− ωxi
1− 1N
{(piCC − piDC)xi
+(piCD − piDD)(1− xi)− 1
N
(piCC − piDD)}] +O(ω2). (5)
In similar fashion, we can calculate the transition probabilities of Moran-evolution under the Death-Birth (DB) process.
However, for N →∞, the transition probabilities are same under the BD and DB processes, i.e., both the updates lead to
the same dynamics. Thus, here is no need to look at the DB version of Moran-evolution in the well-mixed population.
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Generally, the evolution of the two strategies C and D is described by the deterministic replicator like dynamics for
large populations and the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. And, both dynamics are related
to each other through the following mathematical formalism. Introducing the notations x = limN→∞ xi, t = τN , setting
the probability density c(xi, t) = NP
τ (i) where P τ (i) is the probability that the system is in the state i at time τ , and
replacing the simple rate laws by probability laws, we logically get
c(xi, t+
1
N
)− c(xi, t) = c(xi − 1
N
, t)T+(xi − 1
N
) + c(xi +
1
N
, t)T−(xi +
1
N
)
−c(xi, t)T+(xi)− c(xi, t)T−(xi).
In the limit of large N , the probability densities and the transition probabilities are expanded in a Taylor series at xi
and t upto second order in N−1; the step yields
∂c
∂t
= − ∂
∂xi
[a(xi)c(xi, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2i
[b2(xi)c(xi, t)], (6)
where a(xi) = T
+(xi)−T−(xi) and b(xi) =
√
1
N [T
+(xi) + T−(xi)]. This equation is nothing but the form of Fokker-Plank
equation for finite and large value of N . Now, we know that white noise process ξ(t) is formally defined as the derivative
of the Brownian motion:
ξ(t) =
dB(t)
dt
= B′(t),
and as a(xi) and b(xi) are independent of ξ(t), using the Ito calculus, we can derive a Langevin equation
x˙i = a(xi) + b(xi)ξ(t). (7)
We know that the act of Ito’s formula can be expressed as [32, 33]
<
df [x(t)]
dt
> =
d
dt
< f [x(t)] >
= < a[x(t)]∂xf +
1
2
b2[x(t)]∂2xf > .
That is∫
dxf(x)∂tc(x, t) =
∫
dx[a(x)∂xf +
1
2
b2(x)∂2xf ]c(x, t).
Next, integration by parts gives∫
dxf(x)∂tc(x, t) =
∫
dxf(x)(−∂x[a(x)c] + 1
2
∂2x[b
2(x)c]) + boundary terms.
Under the considering environment, the boundary terms will be vanished and the arbitrariness of f(x) reveals the fact
that the diffusion process could be locally approximated by a Langevin equation.
For relatively large value of N , the noise term, b(x)ξ(t), disappears and only the term a(x) determines the dynamics.
This case reduces to the following deterministic differential equation
x˙ = T+(x)− T−(x), (8)
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and recovers the replicator like equation. The exact form of this equation is written as :
dx
dt
= ωx(1− x)[piCCx+ piCD(1− x)− piDCx− piDD(1− x)] +O(ω2), (9)
where the constant factor ω influences on the time scale. It is clear that for the using of the unmodified expressions of
transition probabilities related to Moran process, the Eq.(8) turns out to be the third order standard replicator equation
instead of the adjusted replicator equation (compare to [6]). Since Eq.(9) does not depend on the probability terms
explicitly even though its derivation depends on the classical probability concept, here we consider the equation as a
deterministic one.
Next, we have to take an initiative to construct a stochastic platform to measure the accuracy of the outcomes of the
deterministic model. Here, the stochastic version of Moran-evolution of cooperation in finite populations can be portrayed
through the Langevin stochastic differential equation as well as Gillespie algorithm [34, 35], where Moran-evolution is
defined by Gillespie algorithm in the form of the two reactions: Cooperator+ Defector → Cooperator+ Cooperator, and
Cooperator+Defector → Defector + Defector. In this section, we confine ourself to derive the governing equation of
evolution of C (equivalently or D) individual which we have already obtained. Later, in the subsection 4.1 we numerically
show that on what extend the Moran-evolution of cooperation in the analytical method and in the stochastic method are
agreed with each other in the flavours of various game environments; those are defined by the set of two game parameters
(u, v). For the comparison with the discrete evolution graph model in the finite population, the well-mixed results have
also be taken into consideration in the subsection 4.2.
3. The heterogeneous complex network effect on Moran-evolution
3.1. Birth-Death updating through diffusion of individuals
We look attentively at a Moran process on a directed graph with N vertices and degree distribution p(k) for k =
1, 2, ......, N − 1. The individual at each vertex i uses either strategy C or strategy D in a mutual and reciprocal action
with all of its neighbours where the degree of vertex is denoted by ki for i = 1, 2, ......, N . Thus, the average degree of the
graph is z =
∑N
i=1 ki/N or z =
∑
k kp(k) which is the expected number of neighbours of an individual chosen at random.
As the total number of directed edges in the graph is zN , the proportions of the directed edges starting from cooperators
and defectors, denoted by φC and φD, respectively, are defined as φC =
∑
si=C
ki/zN and φD =
∑
si=D
ki/zN , where
si is the strategy of the individual at the vertex i i.e., si ∈ {C,D} for i = 1, 2, ......, N . By the using of the observables
φk,C and φk,D – the proportion of vertices with degree k those are in strategy C and in strategy D, respectively, – the φC
and φD can also be expressed as φC =
1
z
∑
k kp(k)φk,C and φD =
1
z
∑
k kp(k)φk,D. In this article, φC (φD) is called the
frequency of C individuals (D individuals) in the structured framework of the finite population. It is to note that for the
regular graph, i.e., ki = z for all i = 1, 2, ......, N , the φC is equal to x – the frequency of C individuals in the well-mixed
population (see [29]).
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For X,Y ∈ {C,D}, ΦXY denotes the number of directed edges (i, j) with si = X and sj = Y , that is the proportion
of directed edges with strategy pair (X,Y ) in the total set of directed edges is defined as φXY =
ΦXY
ΦCC+ΦCD+ΦDC+ΦDD
=
ΦXY /zN . And under the pair approximation, the conditional probability that a neighbour of a vertex with strategy Y is
a X−individual is given by qX|Y = φY X/φY . Here, evolutionary dynamics on a heterogeneous graph is described by the
variables φX , qX|Y and φXY where φC + φD = 1, qC|X + qD|X = 1, φY X = qX|Y φY and φCD = φDC . More precisely, we
can show that the entire system can be drawn by only two variables φC and φCC .
To continue the flow, we first take Birth-Death (BD) updating process as one of our main intentions is to derive a
rigorous mathematical formulation to measure the Moran-evolution of cooperation under BD updating on a heterogeneous
complex network in a finite population. For BD updating an individual is randomly chosen to reproduce with a probability
proportional to fitness and its offspring then replaces a random neighbour. If a cooperator with degree k is randomly chosen
to reproduce, then according to binomial theorem the probability that this focal individual has exactly kC neighbours
with strategy C and kD neighbours with strategy D is
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|C)kC (qD|C)kD and it would have a fitness of: f0 =
1− ω+ ω[kCk piCC + kDk piCD]. Similar to previous, the payoffs of an ith individual getting from each interaction with a jth
individual are denoted by the piij . On the network, if the other-end individual of the considering link having focal C−
individual, is of D−individual with k˜ degree, then the probability of existence of such configuration would logically be taken
as p(k, k˜) = p(k).kp(k˜)z in respect of the focal individual, and in respect of the other-end individual this probability would
then be given by p(k˜, k) = p(k˜). k˜p(k)z ; that is the conditional probability function is non-symmetric, clearly. Therefore, to
probability that the φC increases by k˜/zN in a time step is the probability that a C reproduces and a D then dies, which
is given by
Pr(∆φC =
k˜
zN
) = p(k)φk,C
∑
kC+kD=k
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|C)kC (qD|C)kD · f0
ϑ
· k − kC
k
×kp(k˜)
z
·
∑
k˜C+k˜D=k˜−1
(k˜ − 1)!
k˜C !k˜D!
(qC|D)k˜C (qD|D)k˜D , (10)
and taking the normalized expression of average existence of cooperators at particular k˜C numbers of cooperators in k˜
numbers of total neighbours as: ( k˜C
k˜
) k˜!
k˜C !k˜D !
(qC|D)k˜C (qD|D)k˜D , the probability that φCC increases by 2k˜C/zN can be calculated
as
Pr(∆φCC =
2k˜C
zN
) =
∑
kC+kD=k−1
p(k) · (k − 1)!
kC !(k − kC − 1)! (qC|C)
kC (qD|C)
k−kC−1 · f0
ϑ
×
∑
k˜≥k˜C
kp(k˜)
z
· φk˜,D · (
k˜C
k˜
)
k˜!
k˜C !(k˜ − k˜C)!
(qC|D)
k˜C (qD|D)
k˜−k˜C , (11)
where ϑ denotes a normalization constant, which is given by the average fitness over all individuals in the population (for
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the notation interpretation see [36]):
ϑ = 1− ω + ω[pC(piCD + (piCC − piCD)qC|C) + (1− pC)(piDC + (piDD − piDC)qD|D)].
Similarly, if a defector with degree k is randomly chosen to reproduce, then according to binomial theorem the prob-
ability that this focal individual has exactly kC neighbours with strategy C and kD neighbours with strategy D is
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|D)kC (qD|D)kD and it would have a fitness of: g0 = 1 − ω + ω[kCk piDC + kDk piDD]. To probability that the
φC decreases by k˜/zN in a time step is the probability that a D reproduces and a C then dies, which is given by
Pr(∆φC = − k˜
zN
) = p(k)φk,D
∑
kC+kD=k
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|D)kC (qD|D)kD · g0
ϑ
· kC
k
×kp(k˜)
z
·
∑
k˜C+k˜D=k˜−1
(k˜ − 1)!
k˜C !k˜D!
(qC|C)k˜C (qD|C)k˜D , (12)
and taking the normalized expression of average existence of defectors at particular k˜D numbers of defectors in k˜ numbers
of total neighbours as: ( k˜D
k˜
) k˜!
k˜C !k˜D !
(qC|C )k˜C (qD|C )k˜D , the probability that φCC decreases by 2k˜C/zN can be calculated as
Pr(∆φCC = −2k˜C
zN
) =
∑
kC+kD=k−1
p(k) · (k − 1)!
kD!(k − kD − 1)! (qC|D)
k−kD−1(qD|D)
kD · g0
ϑ
×
∑
k˜≥k˜C
kp(k˜)
z
· φk˜,C · (
k˜D
k˜
)
k˜!
k˜C !(k˜ − k˜C)!
(qC|C)
k˜C (qD|C)
k˜−k˜C . (13)
The natural movement in each of the time steps by interchanging the locations of C individual and D individual
on a network is called here diffusion of individuals where two neighbouring individuals are selected randomly. Now, we
incorporate the effect of diffusion in this structured model with probability q, and through the diffusion process, the
probability and the expectation of the rate of change of φC by
k−kˆ
zN , respectively, are
Pr(∆φC =
k − kˆ
zN
) = p(k, kˆ), (14)
and
< (∆φC =
k − kˆ
zN
) > =
N−1∑
kˆ=1
N−1∑
k=1
k − kˆ
zN
Pr(∆φC =
k − kˆ
zN
)
= 0. (15)
The simple conclusion is: diffusion does not directly have any effect on the concentration of φ. In this context, the
probabilities related to the two links that φCC increases or decreases by 2(kC − kˆC)/zN are obtained as
Pr(∆φCC =
2(kˆC − kC)
zN
) = φCDp(k, kˆ)
∑
k≥kC
(k − 1)!
kC !(k − kC − 1)! (qC|C)
kC (qD|C)
k−kC−1
×
∑
kˆ≥kˆC
(kˆ − 1)!
kˆC !(kˆ − kˆC − 1)!
(qC|D)
kˆC (qD|D)
kˆ−kˆC−1, (16)
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Pr(∆φCC =
2(kC − kˆC)
zN
) = φDCp(k, kˆ)
∑
k≥kC
(k − 1)!
kC !(k − kC − 1)! (qC|D)
kC (qD|D)
k−kC−1
×
∑
kˆ≥kˆC
(kˆ − 1)!
kˆC !(kˆ − kˆC − 1)!
(qC|C)
kˆC (qD|C)
kˆ−kˆC−1. (17)
That is, due to diffusion in the (D,C)-link – corresponding to the degree coordinate (k, kˆ) – the probability of average
increment of (C,C)-link at the D-end is
′
Pr(∆φCC =
2(k − 1)
zN
· qC|D) = φDCp(kˆ, k), (18)
and the probability of average decrement of (C,C)-link at the C-end is
′
Pr(∆φCC = −2(kˆ − 1)
zN
· qC|C) = φDCp(k, kˆ). (19)
As the model is an asynchronous model – like voter model, i.e., in each time step diffusion will possibly occur either in the
(C,D)-link or in the (D,C)-link, thus the time evolution of φC and φCC , respectively, is given by
dφC
dt
=
N−1∑
k˜=1
N−1∑
k=1
k˜
zN
Pr(∆φC =
k˜
zN
)−
N−1∑
k˜=1
N−1∑
k=1
k˜
zN
Pr(∆φC = − k˜
zN
), (20)
dφCC
dt
= (1− q) [
N−1∑
k˜C=1
N−1∑
k=1
2k˜C
zN
Pr(∆φCC =
2k˜C
zN
)−
N−1∑
k˜C=1
N−1∑
k=1
2k˜C
zN
Pr(∆φCC = −2k˜C
zN
)]
+q [
N−1∑
kˆ=1
N−1∑
k=1
2(k − 1)
zN
· qC|D
′
Pr(∆φCC =
2(k − 1)
zN
· qC|D)
−
N−1∑
kˆ=1
N−1∑
k=1
2(kˆ − 1)
zN
· qC|C
′
Pr(∆φCC = −2(kˆ − 1)
zN
· qC|C)]. (21)
It is not too hard to show that in the quasi-steady-state φC = φk,C and φD = φk,D. We apply these relations in order
to simplify the Eq.(21) and after some algebras, we have
dφCC
dt
= (1− q).2φCD
zN
[1− (z − 1)(qC|C − qC|D)] + q.2φCD
zN
[(z − 1)(qC|D − qC|C)] +O(ω). (22)
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We also note that for each degree k, the time evolution of φk,C with consideration of diffusion process is given by
dφk,C
dt
= (1− q)[ 1
Np(k)
Pr(∆φk,C =
1
Np(k)
)− 1
Np(k)
Pr(∆φk,C = − 1
Np(k)
)]
+q[
1
Np(k)
Pr(∆φk,C =
1
Np(k)
)− 1
Np(k)
Pr(∆φk,C = − 1
Np(k)
)]
=
1
Np(k)
(p(k))φk,DqC|D − p(k))φk,CqD|C) +O(ω). (23)
As φCC , φk,C , φk,D are faster variables than φC , those go to their quasi-steady-state while the slow variable φC stays
approximately constant, and as we are interested in dynamics of φC , to get the specific relations in the quasi-steady-state
of the fast variables we set dφCCdt = 0 and
dφk,C
dt = 0, the obtained relations respectively are: (qC|C − qC|D) = 1−qz−1 and
φC = φk,C . With similar fashion φk,D can be approximated by φD. Therefore, the simplified form of the Eq.(20) is written
as
dφC
dt
=
ω
zNϑ
(
z + q − 2
z − 1 )φC(1− φC)[α+ z(piCD − piDD) + q(piCD − piCC)
+α(z + q − 2)φC ] +O(ω2), (24)
where α = piCC −piCD−piDC +piDD, and the influential time-factor is equal to ωzNϑ ( z+q−2z−1 ). Taking t′ = ωzNϑ ( z+q−2z−1 )t and
using the transition probabilities related to Moran process, the modeling formalism brings out the third-order standard
replicator equation with the transformed payoff matrix:

C D
C (z − 1)(piCC − piDC) (z − 1)(piCD − piDD)
D (q − 1)(piDC − piDD) (q − 1)(piCC − piCD)
.
In the latter section through an analysis of the three equilibria of the global dynamics of φC we mainly emphasis on how
an internal equilibrium point is to be affected by the degree of a graph – the number of links among the individuals. Well
known procedure – the perturbation method in linear stability analysis – of ordinary differential equation reminds us that
the internal equilibrium is stable when α < 0 and unstable when α > 0.
3.2. Death-Birth updating through diffusion of individuals
In this update procedure in each time step an individual is chosen for death and to fill the vacant site the procedure
chooses an offspring among the neighbours of the focal individual with the probability proportional to the fitness of
the parent of the chosen offspring. Adopting the previous configuration structure, we get that if the randomly chosen
focal individual is a defector, then the expected payoffs of its neighbours of C strategist and D strategist respectively
are hC = (z − 1)qC|C(piCC − piCD) + zpiCD and hD = (z − 1)qC|D(piDC − piDD) + zpiDD, and if the randomly chosen
focal individual is a cooperator, then the expected payoff of its neighbours of C strategist and D strategist is lC =
(z − 1)qC|C(piCC − piCD) + (z − 1)piCD + piCC and lD = (z − 1)qC|D(piDC − piDD) + (z − 1)piDD + piDC , respectively; where
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for the focal individual having the defector character and the cooperator character the fitnesses of neighbour individuals
are denoted by small letters f and g respectively with the appropriate subscripts (see the section 2).
According to the update rule for the chosen defector individual with degree k in which kC neighbors are with strategy
C and kD neighbours with strategy D, the probability that φC increases by ∆φC =
k
zN in each time step is
Pr(∆φC =
k
zN
) = p(k)φk,D
∑
kC+kD=k
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|D)
kC (qD|D)
kD · kCfC
kCfC + kDfD
. (25)
And if the chosen individual for death is cooperator, then the probability that φC decreases by −∆φC = kzN in each time
step is
Pr(∆φC = − k
zN
) = p(k)φk,C
∑
kC+kD=k
k!
kC !kD!
(qC|C)
kC (qD|C)
kD · kDgD
kCgC + kDgD
. (26)
Then, the time evolution of φC is given by
dφC
dt
=
N−1∑
k=1
k
zN
Pr(∆φC =
k
zN
)−
N−1∑
k=1
k
zN
Pr(∆φC = − k
zN
). (27)
Similar to previous subsection, we can also derive the quasi-steady relations: (qC|C − qC|D) = 1−qz−1 , φC = φk,C and
φD = φk,D. Using these relations the simplified form of Eq.(27) is given by the following expression:
dφC
dt
=
ω
N
(
z + q − 2
z − 1 )φC(1− φC)[z(piCD − piDD) + (1− q)(piCC − piCD +
α
z
)
+α(1 +
1
z
)(z + q − 2)φC ] +O(ω2), (28)
where α = piCC−piCD−piDC+piDD, and the influential time-factor is equal to ωN ( z+q−2z−1 ). On consideration of low diffusion
rate, i.e., neglecting the term qz , taking t
′ = ωN (
z+q−2
z−1 )t and using the transition probabilities related to Moran process,
the modeling formalism brings out the third-order standard replicator equation with the transformed payoff matrix:

C D
C (z − 1−qz )(piCC − piDC) (z − 1−qz )(piCD − piDD)
D (q − 1− 1−qz )(piDC − piDD) (q − 1− 1−qz )(piCC − piCD)
.
Same intention is to be held here also with the note that the condition of a stable equilibrium is interpreted by α < 0
while α > 0 is the unstable condition of an internal equilibrium. Under the both updating processes, Birth-Death and
Death-Birth, more logical forms of the replicator dynamics equations on graphs are obtained than the known equations of
that (see [18]). Here the step by step procedure of approximation calculations is very carefully handled.
Before going into the model analysis, in order to select the procedure to determine the equilibrium strategies a question
can be asked: Is there any difference between the concept of evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population and for a
network selection? The simple answer is yes. The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and the strict Nash equilibrium are
both dependent on the original payoff matrix in the well-mixed population, while not only the ESS but also the strict Nash
equilibrium are to be influenced by the transformed payoff matrix; basically both are to be calculated on the transformed
11
payoff matrix which governs the Moran-evolution in structured population; and author claims that concept-wise there is
no difference between ESS and strict Nash equilibrium (compare with [37]). We know that a monomorphic population of
a strict Nash equilibrium rejects the invasion of any other strategy; the fact justifies the term equilibrium. Throughout
the paper, we consider the strict Nash equilibrium – traditional stability concept.
4. Comparative analysis between the theoretical predictions and the stochastic simulations
Now, it is the stage to specify the game environments. In the consideration of a two-player version of the interaction,
we utilise the following payoff matrix for the row player [4]

C D
C b2 (1 + v)− c b2 − c
D b2 0
,
where in a common structural framework, cooperators pay cost c > 0 to provide a benefit b > c. The benefit is equally
split between the two players, regardless of their strategies in the influence of the two weighted factors one and v. Clearly,
the benefits are synergistically enhanced if v > 1 and if v < 1 loss of benefits is accounted. Defectors neither pay cost
nor contribute benefit. Based on this rule, in order to encompass general social dilemmas, we normalise the payoff matrix
by adding c, then dividing by b/2. Under the constraints: c > 0 and b/2 > 1, the rescaling procedure reduces selection
strength; the deed is feasible because we are focusing on the weak selection limit. Hence, after the rescaling and introducing
the cost-benefit ratio, u = 2c/b, the form of normalized payoff matrix is given by:

C D
C 1 + v 1
D 1 + u u
.
The characters of the four fundamental social dilemmas are explained through the following relations between the two
game parameters u and v:- Prisoner’s Dilemma: 1 + v > u > 1, u > v; Stag-Hunt Game: v > u > 1; Snowdrift Game:
1 > u > v; Byproduct Mutualism: u < 1, u < v. We capture these four social dilemmas in the well-known three game
classes, namely, Dominance game, Coexistence game and Coordination game.
4.1. Moran-evolution in well-mixed populations
In this subsection, the evolution of cooperation is studied through the comparison between the deterministic structure
and the stochastic structure. Here, we use the two formalisms for stochastically describing the time behavior of cooperation
population, one is Langevin stochastic framework structure, which is directly related to the master equation and another is
a Gillespie stochastic framework structure which uses a rigorously derived Monte Carlo procedure to numerically simulate
the time evolution of the given reaction system. In the section 2, we have already mentioned the reaction system that
12
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Figure 1: Moran-evolution of cooperation in the deterministic framework structure and in the Gillespie stochastic framework structure. Draw
attention to the deviation between the deterministic structure and the stochastic structure. The value of population size, the initial value of the
population size of cooperators, and the value of intensity of selection, among the three games, are N = 1000, i = 500, ω = 0.01, respectively.
The sets of the game parameter values from left to right are:- Byproduct Mutualism game: (u, v) = (0.2, 0.3), Snowdrift game: (u, v) = (0.5, 0.3)
and Stag-Hunt game: (u, v) = (1.2, 1.6). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
addresses the Moran process appropriately. And, now, it is important to define the propensity of each reaction in order to
achieve Gillespie-algorithmic version of Moran-Evolution. Here, the propensity of the reaction of creation of a cooperator
is defined as: average birth strength of cooperators on the fraction of the death of defectors in the particular infinitesimal
time interval, this is equal to T+i × number of coopetators. Similarly, the propensity of the reaction of destruction of a
cooperator is defined as: average birth strength of defectors on the fraction of the death of cooperators in the particular
infinitesimal time interval, this is equal to T−i × number of defectors.
It would be relevant to point out that as in the deterministic structure the Moran-evolution of cooperation population
is directly proportional to the intensity of the selection, ω and as the model structure is based on the weak selection
framework, the overall evolution process is quite slow – which happens in the natural world. Moreover, the dynamics in
Gillespie stochastic framework structure is slower than the deterministic structure, inherently. Reason for that we capture
both the dynamics at the same time coordinate system through the relation of: tdeterministic = ω× tstochastic. Here, the
comparison is made in view of that whether the trajectories of two dynamics in the different measurement patterns follow
the same path or not. However, as the deterministic equation is derived from the Langevin equation, there is no time lag
between two time scales related to the Langevin and deterministic pair. Additionally, in the following analysis, it is to
be noted that the nature of randomness of Langevin stochastic dynamics is relatively lower than the Gillespie stochastic
dynamics which is also expected according to their mathematical formalisms.
Following the three scenarios defined by the three different payoff matrices corresponding to the three game classes, the
model analysis is performed. We start with the dominance game to be interpreted as either piCC > piDC and piCD > piDD,
expressing that C individual is favourable than D individual, or piDC > piCC and piDD > piCD, showing the opposite fact
that D individual dominates C individual. Both Byproduct Mutualism (BM) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) belong to the
category of dominance game. In the Byproduct Mutualism (BM) the fitness strength of C individual is invariably higher
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than D individual, whereas in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) D individual invariably gains higher payoff than C individual.
In this arena, the mentioned outcomes of the dynamical model are obtained by varying the initial size of cooperators and
the model parameters through the following ranges: 500 ≤ i ≤ 600, 0.01 ≤ ω ≤ 0.001, 0 < u < v < 2.5 meets u < 1 for BM
game and 1 < u < 1 + v < 3.5 meets u > v for PD game. In the most of the cases, it is assumed that at the initial state of
the process, the population consists of 50% of individuals with the C strategy and remaining 50% of individuals with the D
strategy so that either of the strategies does not get the initial advantage. With this initial value, at the end of the process,
we do not encounter any deviation from the value of ρC = 1 for BM game and from the value of ρD = 1 for PD game
in the deterministic framework structure while, on the contrary, the deviation about the expected value 1 of the fixation
probabilities of C and D is observed over a specific number of different stochastic structure realizations, and the value of
this deviation is higher in Gillespie stochastic structure than the Langevin stochastic structure. Moreover, in the setting
range Gillespie stochastic structure is unable to show the natural character of evolutionary PD game dynamics. Whatever
the values of parameters we use, we can observe the deviation of the fixation probability; however, it is seen that after
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
C
o
o
p
e
ra
to
rs
Dominance Game
(Byproduct Mutualism)
Dominance Game
(Prisoner’s Dilemma)
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
o
f
C
o
o
p
e
ra
to
rs
Coexistence Game
(Snowdrift Game)
Coordination Game
(Stag-Hunt Game)
Time
Figure 2: Moran-evolution of cooperation in the deterministic framework structure and in the Langevin stochastic framework structure. Draw
attention to the deviation between the deterministic structure and the stochastic structure. The stochastic trajectories are fluctuated around
the black deterministic trajectory. The value of population size, the initial value of the population size of cooperators, and the value of intensity
of selection, among the three games, are N = 1000, i = 500, ω = 0.01, respectively, same as Fig.1. The sets of the game parameter values from
left to right and then from top to bottom are:- (u, v) = (0.2, 2), (u, v) = (2.2, 2), (u, v) = (0.5, 0.3) and (u, v) = (1.1, 2). (For interpretation of
the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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the increase of certain value of the initial size of cooperators (defectors in the case of PD game) the fixation-probability-
fluctuation is disappeared. The most noticeable observation comes next as the flip side of the preceding observation when
the stochastic structure shows the increase in the strength of the deviation with decreasing of the selection strength, ω.
The inference is that a small perturbation about the neutral drift makes high deviation in the value 1 of the fixation
probability where at the neutral drift, the value of the fixation probability is to be obviously equal to 0. Thus, the
aspect highlights the highly unstable character of neutral drift. In this series of observations, the last finding is that with
increasing of the fitness parameter u in case of the defection domination game or v in case of the cooperation domination
game, the fixation-probability-fluctuation over the different simulations tends to the numerical value 0 but never attains
to the limiting value properly in the mentioned ranges. The Fig.1 and Fig.2 are depicted for some specific values of the
game parameter pair, these are the representatives of the overall outcomes of those specific values of the (u, v) pairs which
form the bunch of the different simulations; however, for the certain limitations as well as avoiding the obscurity in the
figure presentation we do not show all the curves having fluctuation about one.
We attain the second scenario through the coexistence game, when piCC < piDC and piCD > piDD and the game
determines that in the intertype competition, both types are at a less favourable when present in great quantity, and are
in a favourable when present in less quantity. Clearly, this is the criterion for the existence of an internal equilibrium
point where the two types coexist. The snowdrift game (SD game) is a specific example of coexistence game. The internal
equilibrium point is calculated by the well known formula of replicator dynamics, given by x∗ = piDD−piCDpiCC−piCD−piDC+piDD ;
however, the taking time to reach the point is relatively high here. And the fluctuation at ρC = ρD = 0 is prominently
visible in the stochastic structures; also, over the prolonging simulation time range Gillespie stochastic structure fails to
demonstrate the coexistence phenomenon in the given parameter constraints: 1 > u > v. The deficiency is unnoticeable
with higher value of the population size. The fact suggests that sometime the high stochasticity leads unrealistic result
because in the latter section we show that in a finite population structure the coexistence is relatively common; which is
intuitively quite acceptable.
The coordination game pattern in which piCC > piDC and piCD < piDD, represents the third and last scenario where the
advantage linearly depends on the summation value of the payoffs of the intratype and intertype competitions in such a
way for piCC +piCD > piDC +piDD, type C−individual dominates type D−individual and on the contrary, in the case of less
than type inequality, D individual is favourable. For this reason, stag-hunt game (SH game), an example of coordination
games, has a stable equilibrium point either at x∗ = 1 or x∗ = 0 in the game parameter range: 2.5 > v > u > 1. The
fluctuation at the point ρC = 1 has been shown in the coordination-game-panel of the Fig.1. Regarding the computer
simulation, the fluctuation at the point ρD = 1 (or at the point ρC = 1) is also seen over many stochastic realizations
with that expectation at the end of the process, ρD (or ρC ) will have to take either value 1 (or value 0) for the defection
dominance game or the value 0 (or value 1) for the cooperation dominance game. Similar to previous, the randomness
character is higher in Gillespie structure than the Langevin stochastic structure relative to the theoretical prediction of
Moran-evolution of cooperation.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the one of the initial population structures represented by Barbasi-Albert network with average degree 9. Here, in
1000 individuals, the initial allotments of cooperators on vertices are defined through the command: random()<0.5, where w = 0.01, same as
previous. The general rule to determine a initial number of cooperators have been set up as random()< neighbourhood of the predicted value
φ∗C(t, 6.5). The solid black balls indicate the cooperators. Each update procedure do run up to the 5 × 104 time steps and each simulation
point of all simulations φ∗C(5 × 104, z) is obtained by averaging the values of φC(t, z) over the last 10, 000 time steps. Among the 10 different
network-simulation realizations, the three values of the random variable φ∗C(5× 104, z) – the most closed value along with the upper and lower
ranges of deviation about the analytically predicted value – have been plotted for each value of z in a comparison framework.
4.2. Moran-evolution in structured populations
We now proceed to measure the accuracy of the theoretical results by comparison with models for dynamics on networks
to be characterised as the class of dynamical network models in which the network topology is fixed throughout time.
Following the either of the two update rules, on the nodes-represent-individuals network, the cooperation and defection
states of individuals change over time through their interaction with other individual-states those are connected to them.
Here, the changes move asynchronously, like voter model. We consider games played on two commonly use families of
networks: the regular graphs (RG), and the scale-free networks – in particular the Barbasi-Albert networks (BAN). Each
individual numerically takes either 0, equating the defection or 1, equating the cooperation (see Fig.3). Both update rules
accomplish two specific steps: in one step, reproduction takes place as a consequence of an individual’s fitness and in the
other step, death occurs in a random way. Besides the order of these two steps, the selection of an individual depends upon
the payoff matrix of the considering game and the number of connected links with the individual, and algorithmic point
of view both the influential factors act on the evolution of an individual’s character according to the well-known concept
of preferential attachment. Reason for that it is natural to expect under either of the update rules both cooperation and
defection can be beneficial or not. However, keeping in mind the analogous concept of the notable friendship paradox –
a randomly selected neighbour of a randomly selected node is likely to have a larger-than-average degree – we can say
that in the context of the cooperation dominance game, the DB update model would promote cooperation while in the
BD update model, promotion of cooperation would be a slow procedure because a chosen cooperator can replace either a
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cooperator or a defector that implies either the cooperators increases their number or remains unchanged in each of the
iterative steps.
To start the analysis, at the beginning of this subsection, we have to point out the ranges of the feasible parameter
space (z, q, (u, v)) of the internal equilibrium φ∗C , by using the two conditions 0 ≤ φ∗C ≤ 1 and α = v − 1 ≶ 0. The simple
algebras provide the following forms of the stable spaces where α < 0 :
z(v − u) ≤ v − (1− q)
v(q − 1) + 1 ≤ z(1− u)
 corresponding to BD updating
and
(1− u) + (1− q
z
) ≤ α( 1
z2
− 1)
(1− q)(α(1 + 1
z
) + 1) ≥ z(u− 1)
 corresponding to DB updating.
To get the unstable spaces, we have to change the directions of inequalities. Clearly, a numerical set value of (z, q, (u, v))
is to be feasible if it satisfies one of these four sets of inequalities.
4.2.1. Dominance game
Due to the limitations of the feasible ranges, Byproduct Mutualism and Prisoner’s Dilemma are sole representative
of the dominance Game in the BD update model and in the DB update model, respectively. In evolutionary BM game
dynamics of well-mixed version, cooperation is a strict Nash equilibrium where the three equilibria are: x∗ = 0 (unstable),
x∗ = u−1v−1 (unstable with the constraint: 0 < u < v < 1), x
∗ = 1 (stable). For the BD updating, on the flip side of
the same dynamics, the cooperation is to be a strict Nash equilibrium if v − u > q−1z−1 while on the condition 1−uv < q−1z−1
the defection acts as a strict Nash equilibrium role. That is, for v = 0 winning condition of cooperator over defector is
b
c > 2(
z−1
1−q ); on the contrary defector can only win over cooperator in the diffusion scenario with having a numerical value
greater than one. Here, in the structured framework the internal equilibrium can play the dual characters, one is a stable
character on the condition of v < 1 and another is the one-sided unstable character on the condition of v > 1. We use the
phrase one-sided unstable character because on the condition of v > 1 in the feasible region, the internal equilibrium φ∗C
exhibits unstable character only if φC(t0) > φ
∗
C(t), while if φC(t0) < φ
∗
C(t), then
dφC(t)
dt > 0 implies in any circumstances
φC(t) converges to φ
∗
C(t).
To perform the quantitative analysis, we comply with the three events in all the outcomes viz.: the decreasing event in
which the proportion of cooperators is decreased, the exact event in which the proportion of cooperators lies on the range
(−0.05 +φ∗C , 0.05 +φ∗C), and the increasing event in which the proportion of cooperators is increased, where corresponding
probability measurement variables are denoted by Pd, Pe and Pi, respectively, and their values have been tabulated at
each value of z 1; these variables characteristically are three random variables. The increase and the decrease are relative
1The calculation procedure: According to the classical definition of probability if at z = z1 an event can occur in h different ways out of a
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to the number of cooperators at the beginning of the Moran-evolution process. Comparison between the theoretical results
and the computer simulation data that is done through figure presentation and tabulated data analysis leads to the same
conclusion where cooperation is a strict Nash equilibrium (see Fig.4 and Table 1). The deviation in the measurement of
accuracy of the theoretical results is slightly large at the z = 3 on both families of figures, whereas the deviation-value is
being small at z = 6.
Table 1: Evolutionary BM game dynamics at equilibrium
(Pd,Pe,Pi) at z = 3 at z = 4 at z = 5 at z = 6 at z = 7 at z = 8 at z = 9 at z = 10
blue: RG (0.8, 0.0, 0.2) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.7, 0.5, 0.3) (0.8, 0.6, 0.2) (0.2, 0.0, 0.8) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.8, 0.1, 0.2) (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)
blue: BAN (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) – (0.6, 0.5, 0.4) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) – (0.8, 0.0, 0.2) –
red: RG (0.6, 0.0, 0.4) (0.8, 0.4, 0.2) (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.1, 0.3, 0.9) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7)
red: BAN (0.6, 0.0, 0.4) – (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) – (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) –
black: RG (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.6, 0.4, 0.4) (0.4, 0.2, 0.5) (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.5, 0.4, 0.5) (0.2, 0.3, 0.8)
black: BAN (0.3, 0.0, 0.7) – (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) – (0.2, 0.3, 0.8) – (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) –
We have seen that in the context of evolutionary PD game dynamics in well-mixed population, C individual is dominated
by D individual. The dynamics having defection Nash equilibrium, determines two equilibria: x∗ = 0 (stable), x∗ = 1
(unstable) where the internal equilibrium x∗ = u−1v−1 is undefined. On the contrary, for DB updating in the feasible region
of a structured population, the PD game dynamics can define the one-sided unstable internal equilibrium on the condition
of v > 1. The important note is that in the structured framework, criterion for C and D to be a strict Nash equilibrium
respectively is : u − v < 1z−1 i.e., for v = 0, bc > 2(z − 1) instead of bc > (average) degree of the graph and 1z−1 < u−1v .
That is, both C and D can be Nash equilibria, but if at a low number of links in which D exists as a Nash equilibrium
strategy, then we are unable to define the internal equilibrium similar to well-mixed population structure. Basically, the
possibility of coexistence of cooperators and defectors is high here with the reality that a particular strategy can dominate
or can be dominated by other strategy.
Same as previous, the incoherence data of (Pd,Pe,Pi) reveal simply the character of the stochastic dynamics (see Table
2) where on the chosen values of (u, v), the strategy C and strategy D both are strict Nash equilibria – except at z = 3
and z = 4 – in the sense that the cooperators try to raise the rate of birth while the defectors try to survive. The result of
that, whole population tends to a situation of coexistence with the high proportion value of cooperators than the defectors.
Here, all the coordinate values of (Pd,Pi) also unfold this character of the evolutionary dynamics. At the beginning, z = 3,
high average numerical value of Pi than the Pd is the indication of cooperators’ enhancement. However, this enhancement
is not hundred percentages ensured. The first column in Fig.5 shows the variation of φ∗C(z) under the Moran-evolutionary
game dynamics of PD version.
total number of n random experiments, then the value of the event is h
n
.
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Table 2: Evolutionary PD game dynamics at equilibrium
(Pd,Pe,Pi) at z = 3 at z = 4 at z = 5 at z = 6 at z = 7 at z = 8 at z = 9 at z = 10
blue: RG (0.6, 0.0, 0.4) (0.5, 0.3, 0.5) (0.6, 0.4, 0.4) (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) (0.3, 0.2, 0.7)
blue: BAN (0.3, 0.0, 0.7) – (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) – (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) – (0.5, 0.3, 0.5) –
red: RG (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.2, 0.0, 0.8) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.3, 0.7) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5)
red: BAN (0.2, 0.1, 0.8) – (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) – (0.8, 0.1, 0.2) – (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) –
black: RG (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.4, 0.4, 0.6) (0.4, 0.3, 0.5) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.1, 0.3, 0.9)
black: BAN (0.3, 0.0, 0.7) – (0.2, 0.0, 0.8) – (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) –
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Figure 4: Moran-Evolution of cooperation through the internal equilibrium trajectory φ∗C(t, z) under Birth-Death updating. Three panels
along the first row are related to the evolution on regular graphs and other three being the evolution on Barbasi-Albert networks have been
placed along the second row. In BM game dynamics, the three trajectories are assigned by the three different colours, blue: (z, 0.2, (0.99, 1.1))
with random()<0.25, red: (z, 0.2, (0.89, 0.9)) with random()<0.85 and black: (z, 0.25, (0.89, 0.9)) with random()<0.8. Similarly, for SD game
dynamics, the three trajectories correspond to the three colours those are defined as, blue: (z, 0.2, (0.61, 0.5)) with random()<0.85, red:
(z, 0.2, (0.61, 0.4)) with random()<0.69 and black: (z, 0.2, (0.61, 0.3)) with random()<0.5. And, the allotted values for the three colours in
SH game dynamics are, blue: (z, 0.2, (1.4, 1.8)) with random()<0.63, red: (z, 0.2, (1.3, 1.8)) with random()<0.43 and black: (z, 0.2, (1.2, 1.8))
with random()<0.21. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Figure 5: Moran-Evolution of cooperation through the internal equilibrium trajectory φ∗C(t, z) under Death-Birth updating. The same panel
configuration pattern of Fig.4 is followed here. In PD game dynamics, the three different colours are read as, blue: (z, 0.2, (1.6, 1.55)) with
random()<0.83, red: (z, 0.3, (1.42, 1.41)) with random()<0.73 and black: (z, 0.2, (1.42, 1.39)) with random()<0.73. Similarly, for SD game
dynamics the three colours are defined as, blue: (z, 0.2, (0.81, 0.47)) with random()<0.58, red: (z, 0.2, (0.85, 0.47)) with random()<0.5 and
black: (z, 0.2, (0.9, 0.3)) with random()<0.23. And, the allotted values for the three colours in SH game dynamics are, blue: (z, 0.2, (1.5, 1.6))
with random()<0.5, red: (z, 0.2, (1.57, 1.6)) with random()<0.65 and black: (z, 0.4, (1.57, 1.6)) with random()<0.75. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
4.2.2. Coexistence game
The evolutionary snowdrift game dynamics in well-mixed population – a specific example of coexistence game dynamics
– is characterised as nether C nor D is a Nash equilibrium with three equilibria: x∗ = 0 (unstable), x∗ = 1−u1−v (stable),
x∗ = 1 (unstable). For both updating, the corresponding evolutionary dynamics on structured pattern determines a stable
internal equilibrium φ∗C(t) where the natures of other two equilibria remain also unchanged. In addition, SD dynamics
retains the identical Nash equilibrium criterion. However, in case of BD updating either strategy, not both simultaneously,
is a Nash equilibrium while DB updating reveals the fact that C can only be a Nash equilibrium. The sets of inequalities:
u − v > 1−qz−1 , q−1z−1 < 1−uv } corresponding to BD updating and u − v > 1z−1 , 1z−1 > u−1v } corresponding to DB updating,
are satisfied for a wide range of parameter space (z, q, (u, v)), which asserts that possibility of coexistence of cooperators
and defectors is high enough.
Here, neither C nor D is favourable in z past the certain numerical value, that being clarified in Figs.4-5 along the
20
Table 3: Evolutionary SD game dynamics at equilibrium
(Pd,Pe,Pi) at z = 3 at z = 4 at z = 5 at z = 6 at z = 7 at z = 8 at z = 9 at z = 10
blue: RG (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.2, 0.6, 0.8) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.7, 0.4, 0.3) (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.1, 0.0, 0.9)
blue: BAN (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) – (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) – (0.1, 0.5, 0.9) – (0.2, 0.1, 0.8) –
red: RG (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.3, 0.3, 0.7) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6)
red: BAN (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) – (0.7, 0.3, 0.3) – (0.4, 0.4, 0.6) – (0.3, 0.4, 0.7) –
black: RG (0.3, 0.3, 0.7) (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.3, 0.2, 0.7) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5)
black: BAN (0.7, 0.6, 0.3) – (0.6, 0.4, 0.4) – (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) – (0.7, 0.2, 0.3) –
blue: RG (0.2, 0.0, 0.8) (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.5, 0.3, 0.4) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.6, 0.1, 0.4)
blue: BAN (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) – (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) – (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) –
red: RG (0.7, 0.0, 0.3) (0.2, 0.3, 0.7) (0.2, 0.4, 0.8) (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.8, 0.2, 0.2) (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) (0.4, 0.0, 0.6)
red: BAN (0.2, 0.3, 0.8) – (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) – (0.6, 0.0, 0.4) – (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) –
black: RG (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) (0.7, 0.4, 0.3) (0.2, 0.0, 0.8) (0.8, 0.2, 0.2) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.9, 0.5, 0.1)
black: BAN (0.9, 0.0, 0.1) – (0.8, 0.3, 0.2) – (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) – (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) –
column of coexistence game. All the results of computer simulation are summarized in Table 3 in the form of (Pd,Pe,Pi).
We notice that the theoretical prediction in coexistence game is in relatively good agreement with numerical iteration
simulation than the other two game dynamics. From this observation, one can draw an important conclusion: nature
always tries to create an environment where all the different characters can survive. This explanation is more supportive
when we examine the coordinate values of (Pd,Pi) in all three evolutionary game dynamics. Mathematically, to this place,
a significant consequence is that inherently the iterative method, partly obeys the stability condition of the theoretical
dynamical equation.
4.2.3. Coordination game
In the category of coordination game dynamics in well-mixed population, the Stag-Hunt game dynamics having C and
D strict Nash equilibria, yields only one unstable equilibrium at the internal position. Similar to previous, this equilibrium
becomes a one-sided unstable equilibrium point φ∗C(t) of structural SH dynamics. We also note that in case of both
updating rules, both strategies can act as strict Nash equilibria on the wide parameter range. As the bistable character
of SH dynamics is unnoticed on the structured patten, here the concept of risk dominant as well as pareto-efficient is
inapplicable. We can say that the basin of attraction of strategy C depends on the increasing and decreasing nature of
the internal equilibrium trajectory φ∗C(t, z). On the contrary, if there is no internal equilibrium, then only we can define
a basin of attraction for strategy D. This is the common phenomenon for all the three game dynamics on the structured
pattern.
Since both characters are strict Nash equilibria, under BD updating, after a defector birth taking place which is
proportional to his/her parent’s fitness the defector will have enough opportunity to replace a cooperator at high values of
z and this possibility increases with increasing of z, which is the explanation of decreasing character of trajectory φ∗C(t, z),
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that being shown in Fig.4 along the third column. To see the other trajectories, a conclusion can draw – which is a
well-know result – that BD updating in general would not favour cooperation in the situation where both characters can
flourish. On the contrary, in the same situation DB updating promotes the cooperation; the outcome is exhibited along
the third column in Fig.5. After a defector death taking place, a cooperator having high fitness value will have enough
opportunity to fill up the vacant place by her offspring and this possibility increases with increasing of z. However, the
major factor of character’s promotion is the set value of (z, p, (u, v)) which is self-explanatory by the values of Table 4,
where under DB updating, the average value of Pi is greater than Pd upto z = 7 while under BD updating, the average
difference of Pi and Pd is small over all values of z, that supports the decreasing fact of a trajectory in appropriate cases.
Table 4: Evolutionary SH game dynamics at equilibrium
(Pd,Pe,Pi) at z = 3 at z = 4 at z = 5 at z = 6 at z = 7 at z = 8 at z = 9 at z = 10
blue: RG (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.3, 0.4, 0.7) (0.7, 0.2, 0.3) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.6, 0.3, 0.4) (0.3, 0.2, 0.7) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.3, 0.2, 0.7)
blue: BAN (0.3, 0.2, 0.7) – (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) – (0.7, 0.3, 0.3) –
red: RG (0.3, 0.3, 0.7) (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) (0.5, 0.3, 0.5) (0.4, 0.3, 0.6) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.6, 0.4, 0.4)
red: BAN (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) – (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) – (0.4, 0.3, 0.7) – (0.5, 0.3, 0.5) –
black: RG (0.3, 0.3, 0.5) (0.3, 0.3, 0.7) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.7, 0.3, 0.3) (0.9, 0.0, 0.1)
black: BAN (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) – (0.4, 0.6, 0.6) – (0.3, 0.2, 0.7) – (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) –
blue: RG (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.3, 0.4, 0.7) (0.7, 0.0, 0.3) (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.6, 0.0, 0.4)
blue: BAN (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) – (0.1, 0.2, 0.9) – (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) – (0.6, 0.1, 0.4) –
red: RG (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) (0.0, 0.0, 1.0) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.5, 0.2, 0.5) (0.7, 0.1, 0.3) (0.5, 0.0, 0.5) (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.5, 0.0, 0.5)
red: BAN (0.3, 0.0, 0.7) – (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) – (0.2, 0.3, 0.8) – (0.4, 0.2, 0.6) –
black: RG (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.4, 0.1, 0.6) (0.6, 0.2, 0.4) (0.2, 0.4, 0.8) (0.3, 0.1, 0.7) (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) (0.7, 0.2, 0.3)
black: BAN (0.4, 0.0, 0.6) – (0.1, 0.3, 0.8) – (0.1, 0.3, 0.9) – (0.5, 0.1, 0.5) –
5. Discussion
Considering the update rules, the evolution of cooperation is portrayed through the medium of the replicator equations
of cooperation in well-mixed and structured populations, in respect of the results compared with the stochastic simulations.
Between the two procedures, analytic and stochastic, it is very hard to tell which one is more appropriate to draw the
dynamics than the other. One can argue that stochasticity put realism in models because any natural dynamics never run
properly along the predictable path and hence stochasticity should be considered to make the model realistic. However, as
the modelling framework offered by computer simulation in general is limited to individual-based stochastic simulations,
the generated results naturally can deviate to true generality and the diverging outcomes of the time consuming procedure
often raises its questionable validity. The fact is that real scenario can only be captured in the comparison mode in a
qualitative as well as quantitative agreement which is demonstrated throughout this research article. The detailed analysis
not only helps us to present some new results but also provides us many evidences to define the disparities – about the
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cooperation enhancement condition – among the various games on structured populations under the setting of Birth-Death
and Death-Birth updating rules, those are reported in earlier literatures (see [17, 38], and references therein).
We know that the dynamics represented by the replicator equation on graphs is the combined effects of two states: the
equilibrium state in the dynamics of local frequencies of an ith strategist next to a jth strategist, qi|j , and the dynamics
of global frequency φC , depending on the qi|js. To get rid the dependency barrier, it is assumed that the global frequency
is in the unchanged state while the local frequencies equilibrate. This assumption is the backbone of the dynamics on
graphs. Ohtsuki and Nowak [18] calculated the equilibrium local frequencies as: q∗C|C =
k−2
k−1xC +
1
k−1 , q
∗
C|D =
k−2
k−1xC},
where global frequency xC is constant in the quasi-steady-state. In such construction, xC plays dual characters over
time, at one time, in the expression of q∗i|j it is constant and on the other times, after substituting it in the place of q
∗
i|j
in the main equation of the global frequency, it is taken as a variable. The construction can be acceptable in certain
point of view. However, to avoid this ambiguity, in the present article, the equilibrium local frequencies are considered
as: q∗C|C = something +
1
z−1 , q
∗
C|D = something}, for q = 0; and the term something is eliminated through the using
of the following relation: q∗C|C − q∗C|D = 1z−1 , which is the well-known quasi-steady-state in the structured framework.
We calculate the condition following the traditional way. Here, the robustness of calculation structure is measured by
noting that x∗ = limz→N−1 φ∗C , for both update rules, that being expected. However, the model clearly reveals that the
structured dynamics is not a linear transformation of the well-mixed dynamics.
In the consideration of evolutionary dynamics on heterogeneous network, it is great challenged to find out the correct
way of modelling the updating of a population. With this intention, in order to tackle the heterogeneity, the concept
of coalescent theory has been utilised in the recent research work of Allen et al. [39]. The theory is implemented to
calculate the benefit-to-cost ratio as a function of coalescence times of random walks. A coalescing random walk (CRW)
– a collection of random walks – is considered on a graph G where walks move independently until two walks coalesce
and the coalescence time is the expected meeting time of random walks from two distinct vertices, representing time to a
common ancestor. Calculating the benefit-to-cost ratios for all possible diverse population structures, the model pattern
rigidifies the known realization that cooperation flourishes most in the presence of the strong pairwise ties. Introducing
the average-number-of-interactions factor Maciejewski et al. [40] explained the exact same reason for the cooperation
enhancement; however, their method was completely different where taken microscopic processes viz.: averaging and
accumulating payoffs on the level of individuals as foundation parts, the macroscopic features of the evolutionary process
on the level of population such as frequency and distribution of cooperators were determined on heterogeneous networks.
As the intention to considering the heterogeneous model is to accept the challenge to handle and to measure the influence
of heterogeneity, it is natural, the question then arises as to whether the current model can read the consequence of graph
heterogeneity? Before answering our question, we have to clarify a specific character of the structural pattern of Barbasi-
Albert scale-free network. The growth of the model is directly dependent on the preferential attachment mechanism
that being used to calculate probability pi which defines that the new node is connected to node i with degree ki, is:
pi =
ki∑
j kj
. And, it is not too hard to show through the rigorous mathematical derivation that the degree distribution
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p(k) of scale-free network follows the power-law rule which is given by: p(k) ∼ k−γ , typically with 2 < γ ≤ 3. We now
introduce a random variable K, assigning the value of the degree of each vertex of the graph, i.e., k is a particular value of
K, implying K ranges from 1 to N − 1. So, heterogeneity measurement tool – the variance, and expectation, respectively,
are: var(K) =
∑N−1
k=1 k
2.p(k)−∑N−1k=1 k.p(k) = ∑N−1k=1 (k2 − k).k−γ and z = ∑N−1k=1 k.p(k) = ∑N−1k=1 k.k−γ . Thus, var(K)
and z can only vary with varying the value of γ, and the concept of the variance to be varied while expectation being
constant is not realistic in any sense; moreover, both the two measures are either increasing or decreasing simultaneously.
Consequently, every viewed observation in this article can be read by the variance – heterogeneity measurement tool of
degree distribution.
Finally, we have reached to our prefixed destination, but this is not our final destination because the model runs
throughout the assumption on unchanged population size over time. However, evolutionary dynamics and ecological pro-
cess, those are dependent on frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations, should be altered in fluctuation
of population size (see [41]). In this connection, we also know that the adaptive network dynamics in which node states
and network topologies dynamically change adaptively to each other is well-establish an area in computational network
science where coevolution rules aim to integrate the adaptive network dynamics into the framework of evolutionary games
– for useful reviews see [42, 25] and for details see the references therein. Therefore, it is time to come to face the real
great challenge to derive the analytical procedure to measure the evolution of cooperation in the fluctuation of population
size; that will be a base model for the corresponding adaptive network simulation. In doing that we will drastically have
to change the basic structure. Our surgical endeavours would surely lead us toward our ultimate destination; however, it
will take time.
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